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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 940050-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No,

RICHARD LEEROY TODD,

2

Defendant/Appellant
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

.1 .b 1'iiJ appc a.l f rorri r o n r i.ct: i o n s of

Hutornob..; l e h o m i r i d e , a

third degree felony, :i n violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207
(Supp. "-

• driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs

thereby

upon anot In--! i; .i t'lass A

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. R 4 1-6-44 (1993).
This Court has jurisdiction
Code

^ the appeal under Utah

)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES A N D STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The followinq issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the court correctly deny defendant's motion t.o

suppress the blood alcohol test result when the blood was taken
wit. h'"'Ul". a warrant alter defendant's refusal?

This claim,, involves

the interpretation of Utah's implied Consent Statute, Utah Code
Ann- § 41-6-44,10 1:19,93), and is reviewed under a correction of
eT"ror star»dar'd

West Vailey Citv v , Streeter, 849 p # 2 d 613, 614

(Utah App. 1 9 9 3 ) .
However, defendant has not properly preserved nor adequately
briefed tin' i l *i' u <

T h fj J ^ f < u e

d e f e n d a 111: " «, • <: ] a i"»p " s '»* a i \»e d a n d

this Court should decline to consider it.

State v. Brown. 856

P.2d 358, 359 n.l (Utah App. 1993) (issues not properly preserved
for appeal are waived);

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah

1988) (footnote and citations omitted) (reviewing court is
entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority
cited).
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support convictions for

automobile homicide and driving under the influence resulting in
an injury accident?

On appeal, the evidence and all reasonable

inferences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict.

State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1991).

Moreover, the defendant must marshal all the evidence in support
of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate that it is
insufficient to support the conviction.

Otherwise, the court may

properly decline to consider the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced.

State v. Chavez, 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Relevant text of constitutional, statutory or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues are included
in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of automobile homicide,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207,
(Supp. 1993) and one count of driving under the influence
resulting in bodily injury upon another, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1993) (R. 1).
2

P r i oi I: ::> 1 2 " i a ] , de fens e c01 ins e 1 m o v e d t o si lppress t he
results of the blood alcohol test 01 1 grounds that the sample had
not been taken i n conformance with U t a h Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 <H

I I1','), k'lih'lii s t a t e s I \\H\

I (if 1 ini i'up|i

il 1 p e r s o n c o n t i nues

to refuse the blood test after being notified of the driver's
license consequences, n o test m a y be given

K. 2 3

'. • '• ' The S t a t :e oj ::.--.

d tl: n 2 fitc

heard argument but

transcript of the hearinc

the record on appeal.

I

Addendur

h

' •
-1-

t

T h e court denied defendant'~ motion ,:..

3 0, A d d e n d Li ni I«1
A jury convicted defendant of both charges.

H e timely

appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant w a s the driver of a pickup truck involved in a
si ng] e car accident o n June 2 7 , 1993 # at approximately 3:05 a.m.
(R. 221 22, 2F*. ^10) ,

T h e only witness provided a statement

that the truck passed h i m traveling eastbound, came into the
•.

"
econstructing \

-. 1 1- marks left

* .: :„; c road,

overcorrectec
truck into

.

,

ai id 1 1 :i s

0 iebL

accident

from

:.. officer concluded t nat the right

H 1 iroacil i n f o ( h e g r a v e l

f it (•- F "1 .

**ame

HI, m l t h e d r i v e r

trying to regain the paved surface sending the
. eventually rolling

.r

- lefendant

s.jrs wei e 1

1 .

One of the p a s s e n g e r s died at .. ... scene and the other w a s
severely injured

(R. 2 2 3 , 2 4 0 - 4 1 ) .
3

There w a s a strong odor of

alcohol at the scene and numerous beer cans around the truck (R.
234, 238, 283) .
When the assigned investigating officer arrived, the
accident victims, including defendant, had already been placed in
ambulances (R. 253) . The officer smelled a definite odor of
alcohol in the ambulance and asked defendant if he had been
drinking.

Defendant replied a couple of beers whereupon he was

arrested for driving under the influence (R. 255, 289, 302, 323).
Defendant refused to submit to a blood draw.

At that point, the

officer instructed the emergency medical technician (EMT) not to
draw blood and the officer left the ambulance.

He returned a few

minutes later, stated that one of the passengers had died, and
instructed the EMT to draw the blood despite defendant's
objection (R.255-57, 315). The accident occurred at 3:05 a.m.
and the blood was drawn at 4:12 a.m. (R.269).

A subsequent blood

analysis revealed a blood alcohol content of .12% (R. 354-55).
At trial, defendant and his witnesses testified that he had
not been drinking the night of the accident and was not
intoxicated (R. 226-27, 229, 365-66).

Defendant did admit to

drinking one beer around 4:30 p.m. the previous afternoon and on
cross said that he drank two beers (R. 378-79, 384, 405) .
Defendant's theory of the accident was that he had fallen
asleep at the wheel after a hard day of working and dancing (R.
4 06).

He also testified that he had bronchitis and had taken

about two and a half tablespoons of Robitussin around 7:00 p.m.
and approximately 6 and a half ounces of Vicks cough syrup an
4

hour to an hour and a half prior to the accident (R. 379-80, 386,
3 94, 399-400).

Defendant acknowledged that he had begun to feel

tired about twenty minutes before the accident and while he
thought about pulling over, never did (R.387-88, 401-02).

He

specifically denied that he was trying to pull over when the
accident occurred (R. 4 01).

Defendant did not believe that he

was affected by the alcohol or cough syrup (R. 406).
On rebuttal the State's toxicologist testified that it would
have been physically impossible for a person to have a .12% BAC
if he had drunk only what defendant claimed

All of the alcohol

would have been out of his system by the time of the blood draw
at 4:12 a.m. (R. 410-13).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Defendant did not properly preserve his claims for appeal.
In his pre-trial motion to suppress the blood alcohol analysis,
defendant raised an entirely different issue than he now urges on
appeal.

Below, defendant argued that the blood alcohol results

should be suppressed because the officer did not comply with Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) (Supp.1992).

Apparently, defendant

was unaware that the statute had been amended prior to
defendant's accident.

Defendant now argues that the 1993

amendment to section 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) authorizes an
unconstitutional search and seizure under both the Utah and
United States Constitutions.
Even though defendant cited the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah

5

Constitution in his motion, he offered no legal analysis or
authority to support his position.

On appeal, defendant's

argument is likewise lacking in legal analysis or citation to
authority.

Defendant's cited cases are distinguishable on their

facts and thus, have no bearing on this matter.

Therefore, this

Court should decline to address the search and seizure issue on
appeal.
Even assuming this Court were to reach the merits,
defendant's failure to provide any independent state
constitutional analysis limits the search and seizure issue to an
analysis under the fourth amendment.

Under Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), police may take blood without
consent and without a warrant where there is probable cause to
believe that the person was driving under the influence of
alcohol or other drug and exigent circumstances exist.

Accord

City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994).

Sections

41-6-44.10 (1993) and 41-6-44.5 (1993) are in accordance with
Schmerber.

For this reason, the trial court properly admitted

the blood alcohol results.
As to the sufficiency claim, defendant has failed to marshal
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, therefore, this
Court should refuse to consider defendant's challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.

However, if the Court were to reach

the merits, there is ample evidence to support the jury's
verdict.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DF7~'DANT HAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED NOR
PS ~ VTELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIM OF AN
U CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON
APPEAL; EVEN IF THE COURT REACHES THE MERITS,
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE FRIVOLOUS
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim of an
unconstitutional search and seizure for appeal.
The State does not dispute that defendant refused the blood
test when requested to submit by the officer.

In his motion to

suppress the blood alcohol test results, defendant raised two
arguments:

(1) the blood was taken in violation of Utah's

Implied Consent Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp.
1992), and (2) the blood draw constituted an illegal search and
seizure under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14, of
the Utah Constitution.

The 1992 version of s e " ion

41-6-44.10(2)(a) (Supp. 1992), stated "Following this warning,
unless the person immediately requests that the chemical test or
tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may
be given."
Defendant obviously did not realize that section 41-6-44.10
was amended in the 1993 general legislative session to take
effect on May 3, 1993, deleting the quoted language.

He also

failed to cite to section 41-6-44.5(1) (b), also amended and
taking effect on May 3, 1993, which states in pertinent part "In
a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does
not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible.

Evidence

of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content is admissible
7

except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution."
According to the legislative history, this 'language was added
specifically to allow blood test results into evidence, even if
taken over defendant's refusal, if the offense resulted in a
criminal trial.

See Floor Debate, vote on S.B. 85, 50th Utah

Legis., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1993) (Senate Recording No. 22)
(statement of Sen. Beattie) and Floor Debate, vote on S.B. 85,
50th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1993) (Senate Recording
No. 24) (statements of Sen. Beattie and Sen. Peterson).
On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the
1993 amendment to section 41-6-44.10, a challenge not raised in
the lower court.

In York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah

App. 1994), this Court stated:
"This court will not consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal absent plain
error or exceptional circumstances. State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993);
accord State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 892-93
n.6 (Utah 1993). An issue is preserved for
appeal when "a party . . . timely brings the
issue to the attention of the trial court,
thus providing the court an opportunity to
rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron &
Assoc., Inc. v. Rebel Enter., Inc., 823 P.2d
479, 482-83 (Utah App. 1991).
Since defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the
1993 amendment to section 41-6-44.10 and section 41-6-55-44.5
below, the issue has been waived.

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,

359 n.l (Utah App. 1993); Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(d).
B.

Defendant's claim is unsupported by legal analysis.

On appeal, defendant asserts that although he was subject to
the provisions of the Implied Consent Law, section 41-6-44.10, he
8

retained the right to withdraw that consent by his refusal to
submit.

He further contends that at the time he refused, the

officers were required to obtain a warrant before proceeding with
the blood draw.

Although defendant makes reference to both the

Utah and United States Constitution, he offers no analysis to
show that a warrant was required under these circumstances. He
also offers four case citations without any discussion of why
these cases are applicable to his appeal.

One of his cited

cases, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), specifically
held that a warrant was not required.
In sum, defendant's legal analysis of the issues presented
on appeal is inadequate.

He makes no attempt to apply legal

principles to the facts presented.

Although he cites Schmerber,

defendant does not acknowledge that it is controlling nor that
its holding is contrary to his position.

Accordingly, this Court

should refuse to consider defendant's claims, and affirm his
conviction.

See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah

1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support [his] argument by
any legal analysis or authority we decline to rule on it.");
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) ("[A] reviewing
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.") (footnote and citations omitted).

See also State v.

Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1991) ("[W]hen an appellant's
argument contains no citations to the record and no legal
9

authority, and as such does not comply with briefing rules,"
appellate courts will decline to reach the issue raised on
appeal.)
C.

Defendant's claims are frivolous.

Even if the Court were to determine that there was adequate
preservation of the issues and adequate briefing on appeal,
defendant's claims are without merit.

Defendant argues that

under the Implied Consent statute, he retained his right to
withdraw his consent. This argument was rejected in Cavaness v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 351 (Utah 1979) wherein the court stated that
the implied consent statute was civil in nature and applied to
driver's license revocations only.

Moreover, the statute does

not give a "right" to refuse a chemical test, only the physical
power. Id. at 352-54.
Defendant's claim of an illegal search and seizure is in
direct conflict with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Schmerber.

In Schmerber, under circumstances similar to those

presented here, the Court upheld the warrantless extraction of
blood from a defendant who refused to consent to the procedure.
384 U.S. at 770-72 (footnote omitted).

The Court made clear that

the fourth amendment does not require actual consent before blood
may be extracted without a warrant from a person in a case where
there is probable cause to believe that the person was driving
under the influence of alcohol or some other drug and there are
exigent circumstances.

Similarly, this Court has recognized

under a fourth amendment analysis that exigent circumstances may
10

justify the warrantless extraction of blood.

City of Orem v.

Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1393 (Utah App. 1994) (Exigent
circumstances are determined by the totality of the
circumstances, including rapid dissipation of blood alcohol; the
short time available to obtain the evidence; seriousness of the
offense; and, reasonableness of the police conduct).
Because defendant has not provided any analysis to
explain why exigent circumstances should be treated differently
under the state constitution, the court should decline to
consider this claim.

Id. at 1387 ("We refuse to provide the

independent [state constitutional] analysis defendant has failed
to submit, (citations omitted).
POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO
CONSIDER HIS CLAIMS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE,
ALTERNATIVELY THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT
A.

Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence.

Defendant's brief fails to marshal the evidence that
supports the jury's verdict.

The purpose and spirit of the

marshaling requirement were perhaps best expressed in West Valley
Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
There, the appellant's efforts, in presenting " a general
catalogue of [the] evidence" adduced at trial were found to be
deficient.

The court explained that

the challenger must present in comprehensive
and fastidious order every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists.
11

After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous.
Id.
In State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990), the
Utah Supreme Court applied the marshaling requirement in a
criminal bench trial.

Shortly thereafter, in State v. Moore, 802

P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990), this Court first applied the
standard to criminal appeals from jury verdicts where sufficiency
of the evidence was challenged.
Since that time, this Court has required adherence to the
rule.

State v. Galleqos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 1993)

(court addressed sufficiency of evidence on four counts for which
supporting evidence was marshaled, but refused to address similar
claims on six counts for which evidence was not properly
marshaled); State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992)
(refusal to review sufficiency of the evidence where marshaling
requirement not met);

State v. Chavez, 840 P. 2d 846, 848 (Utah

App. 1992) (refusal to address challenge to trial court's
findings of fact in an evidentiary ruling for failure to marshal
evidence supporting the findings); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,
472-73 (Utah App. 1991) (court refused to address insufficiency
of evidence claim where, instead of marshaling evidence
supporting verdict, defendant simply recounted evidence favorable
to him); State v. Dav, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991)
12

(defendant neither marshaled evidence submitted at trial which
supported jury verdict, nor did he argue why such evidence was
insufficient).
Defendant does nothing more than provide a general
recitation of the facts.

It is not an effort to muster the

evidence favorable to the verdict and demonstrate its
insufficiency.

Because defendant has failed to marshal the

evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this Court should refuse
to address his claim of insufficient evidence.
B.

The jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

Even if the Court finds adequate marshaling, the evidence
was sufficient to support the verdict.

An appellate court gives

broad deference to the fact finder, therefore, its power to
review jury verdicts is limited.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,

784 (Utah 1991); State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah App.
1993).

The court views the evidence and all reasonable

inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict and assumes
the jury believed the evidence and inferences supporting the
verdict.

State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993); State v.

Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert, denied 859 P.2d
585 (Utah 1993).

A jury verdict is reversed only if the evidence

is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
defendant committed the crime.

State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981,

985 (Utah 1993).
In this case, the evidence established all of the requisite
13

elements of the charged offenses.

The State only needed to prove

that defendant had a blood alcohol content over .08%, he drove
negligently, and there was an accident in which someone died and
someone else was injured.

Defendant's own explanation for the

cause of the accident establishes negligence.

He was tired,

taking medication, knew he should pull over but did not (R. 379400).

Coupled with the uncontroverted evidence of a .12% blood

alcohol content (R. 354-55) and death of one passenger and injury
to the other (R. 233, 240-241), the evidence was sufficient to
support the verdict.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has either not preserved his claims for appeal or
provide the legal analysis and support the appellate rules
require.

Even if the Court were to conclude that there was

sufficient preservation and analysis, defendant's claims are
without merit.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the

convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/Y*~

day of October, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JANICE L. FROST
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing brief of appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Elliott Levine, attorney for appellant, Summit County Public
Defender, P.O. Box 526116, Salt Lake City, Utah
ft)^ day of October, 1994.

AQ.U.H.,^^^-
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

U.S. CONST, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
UTAH CONST, art. I, §14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (Supp. 1993).

Automobile homicide.

(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while having
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that renders the
actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner,
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care
that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or
similar circumstances.

(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this
section.

(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol
content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by
Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1993). Driving Tinder the influence
of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol
concentration
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two

hours after the alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.

(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner;
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 (1993). Admissibility of chemical
test results in actions for driving under the influence
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in
which it is material to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests
as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence,
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section
41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol
content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by
Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (1993). Implied consent to
chemical tests for alcohol or drug
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests
of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6,
if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a
peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have been
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited
under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influence
of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug
under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's
body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6.

(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of
the chemical tests under Subsection (1) , and refuses to submit to
any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the
person's license to operate a motor vehicle.

ADDENDUM B

ELLIOTT LEVINE (USB #1939)
Summit County Public Defender
Attorney for Defendant
P.O.B. 526116
Salt Lake city, Utah 84152-6116
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C015RT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

°* St"»*» County
°+«*Q**
*£&

MOTION TO SUPPRESS BLOOD TEST
AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff,
VS.

CASE NO. ^ 3/ 3. D I 501

RICHARD LEEROY TODD,
JUDGE: WILKINSON
Defendant.
COMES NOW ELLIOTT LEVINE, Attorney for the Defendant in the above
captioned case and files this Motion to Suppress pursuant to Rule 12
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and UCA, section 77-23-12,
moving this court to suppress the blood sample taken from the
Defendant and the subsequent laboratory analysis of Defendant's blood
sample•
As grounds for this motion the Defendant asserts that:
1. The drawing of the Defendant's blood sample by force, after
the Defendant was placed under arrest, after the law enforcement
officer twice requested a blood sample from the Defendant, after the
Defendant twice refused to submit to a blood draw and coupled with the
law enforcement officer's failure to give the required admonition
prescribed by UCA, section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) was in violation of UCA,
section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) [to wit: "Following this warning, unless the
person immediately requests that the chemical test or tests as offered

n n o.,

by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given*,f] and
constituted an illegal search and seizure which violated the
Defendant's constitutional rights guaranteed under the 4th Amendment
of the US Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Constitution
of Utah.
2.

The drawing of the Defendant's blood sample was in violation

of UCA, section 41-6-44.10(2)(a).

The refusal of the defendant to

submit to a blood draw after the Defendant was placed under arrest,
after the law enforcement officer twice requested a blood sample from
the Defendant and after the Defendant twice refused to submit to a
blood draw, coupled with the law enforcement officer's failure to give
the required admonition prescribed by UCA, section 41-6-44.10(2)(a).
As legal authority for said motion, Defendant states and relies
upon the following cases and Utah Code annotated sections:
State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah, 1968)
In the Interest of R.L.I., 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1989)
State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App., 1991)
Due to the illegality of the Defendant's blood draw, based upon
the totality of circumstances surrounding the blood draw, Defendant
requests that this motion be granted.
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this matter be set for an
evidentiary hearing prior to the trial in this matter.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they hand-delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on this 20th day of October,
1993 to:

SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
SUMMIT COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 2ND FLOOR
COALVILLE, UT
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No.

FILED'""

Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
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~ 22 1993

C'f* of Summit County
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
RICHARD L. TODD,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BLOOD TEST AND
ANALYSIS
CRIMINAL NO. 931301509 FS

DEFENDANT.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is charged with Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, and Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol and Inflicting Bodily Injury Upon Another, a Class A
Misdemeanor. The defendant was involved in an automobile accident on June 27, 1993 in Echo
Canyon, Summit County, Utah. The arresting officer, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Sheldon
Riches, arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 3:49 a.m. Trooper Riches noticed
that there was a large amount of alcohol containers around the single vehicle that was off to the
side of the road and had rolled over. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript page 14). Trooper Riches
went to the ambulance at the scene and talked to the defendant. The defendant identified himself
as Richard Todd and said that he was the driver. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 15).

Trooper Riches smelled a strong odor of alcohol while inside the ambulance talking to the
defendant. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 15). The defendant said he had been drinking.
(Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16). Trooper Riches then placed the defendant under
arrest. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16). Trooper Riches asked if the defendant would
submit to a chemical test and the defendant refused. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16).
Because of the death of one of the passengers in the vehicle, Shane Hermanson, Trooper Riches
instructed the EMT, who is authorized by the State of Utah, to draw blood from the defendant.
(Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16).
ARGUMENT

I.
THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE BLOOD SAMPLE ARE ADMISSIBLE
Defendant misconstrues the application of Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, in his Motion. Section 41-6-44.10, deals with the implied consent law which
is civil in nature and which provides only for the revocation of the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle. See Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P2d 349 (Utah, 1979). If there has not been compliance
with Section 41-6-44.10, drivers license may be unable to revoke the driving privilege, but that
does not effect the admissibility of the chemical test in the criminal case.
Section 41-6-44.5 specifically authorizes the admission of the defendant's blood test at
trial. Section 41-6-44.5(1) provides:
(a) "In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove
that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in
Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
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(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does not
render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's
blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when
prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution."
Section 41-6-44.5 was amended by the legislature in 1993, which amendment became effective
May 3, 1993. Section 1(b) is a brand new addition to the statute, which is applicable to all
criminal cases after its effective date of May 3, 1993.
Defendant cites Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) as reading as follows:
"Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests that the chemical
test or tests is offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given."
(Defendant's Motion pages 1 and 2)
However, that is not the way Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) reads presently nor is it the way it read
at the time of the offense on June 27, 1993. The legislature amended Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a)
to remove the language cited by defendant prior to the time the defendant committed the offense.
The legislature apparently amended Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) and 41-6-44.5 in response to the
court decisions cited by defendant. Those statutory amendments now legislatively "over rule"
the cases cited by defendant. However, even without the statutory amendments, the cases cited
by defendant are distinguishable from the defendant's case. Each of the three cases cited by
defendant, State v. Cruz. 47 P2d 307 (1968), In the interest of R.L.I.. 771 P. 2d 1068 (Utah,
1989), and State v. Sterger. 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App., 1991) involve defendants who had not
been arrested when the blood was drawn. In all three cases cited by the defendant, the courts
made it clear that the defendants were not under arrest when the blood was drawn. Had the
defendant been under arrest, obviously the blood test would have been admissible under the
former statute.

The court suppressed the tests in the three cases cited by defendant, only

because the defendant was not under arrest.

3

The present Section 41-6-44.5 makes the chemical test admissible even when there has
not been compliance with Section 41-6-44.10. "Evidence of the defendant's blood or breath
alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or
the constitution." It is clear that there is no rule of evidence that prohibits the introduction of
the test results of defendant's blood sample. Likewise, it is well settled that the State can take
a blood test from a driver, even when the driver refuses to give his consent. The United States
Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California. 384 US 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1956) held that the
State of California could constitutionally take by force, if necessary, a blood sample from the
intoxicated driver. The U. S. Supreme Court made it clear in Schmerber v. California that the
States have the right to draw blood and introduce the test results thereof even if the defendant
did not consent to the blood draw.
CONCLUSION
All of the cases cited by defendant are factually distinguishable, because the defendant
was under arrest. The statute cited by defendant is not the current statute in effect and does not
apply to the defendant. The legislature revised Section 41-6-44.5 and Section 41-6-44.10 to
legislatively "over rule" the cases cited by defendant. Clearly, Section 41-6-44.5 makes the
results of the blood sample taken from the defendant admissible.

The only way that the

defendant can keep the results out is to show that it would be prohibited by the Rules of
Evidence or the constitution. Such a showing cannot be made. Based on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California, supra, it is constitutional to take a blood
sample from the defendant even when the defendant has not given his consent or even forcibly
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resists. The blood sample taken from the defendant was proper in all respects, and the test
results of the blood sample are admissible.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Blood Test and the Analysis thereof must be denied.
Respectively submitted

SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of October, 1993,
to Elliott Levine, attorney for defendant, P. O. Box 526116/Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6116.
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BLOOD
TEST AND ANALYSIS

PLAINTIFF,

VS.
RICHARD L. TODD,

CRIMINAL NO. 931301509 FS
DEFENDANT.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Blood Test and Analysis came on regularly for hearing
on October 25, 1993, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
District Court Judge presiding; defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Elliott
Levine, and the plaintiff appeared through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit County
Attorney. The Court considered the Motion, heard the arguments and statements of counsel,
and being fully advised in the premises, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs Motion to Suppress Blood
Test and Analysis be, and the same hereby is, denied.
Dated this

day of October, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

..."
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this 25th day of October, 1993, to Elliott
Levine, attorney for defendant, P. O. Box 526116, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6116.

sycscc/ :<.l//?<t>4&sT?

003i

